The key difference between Figure A and Figure B is indirect job creation, and the key benefit from this difference is that many more and much bigger projects can get funded with the Figure B structure. To elaborate:

　　图A和图B的区别主要在于间接就业的创造，而这一区别的最大利处在于更多更大的项目可以通过图B标明的方式进行融资。具体如下：

　　The traditional “direct” EB-5 program only allows EB-5 investors to be credited with “direct jobs,” defined as W-2 employees of the new commercial enterprise (NCE) that receives EB-5 investor equity. This fact limits the countable jobs (and therefore the maximum EB-5 investment) and also possible structures. There can be only one pot in direct EB-5: all the EB-5 money goes in that one pot as equity and only the full time W-2 jobs in that one pot can be credited to investors. If your business involves multiple entities (for example a holding company for the property and a management company for operations), then you have two pots and direct EB-5 won’t work for you (unless the management company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the holding company, making them essentially a single entity). If your project creates jobs for people who aren’t your W-2 employees (e.g. construction workers on your job site), the direct EB-5 program doesn’t allow counting those jobs. If you’d prefer to segregate EB-5 investors in a separate entity rather than giving them a management role directly in your business and mixing them with your non-EB-5 investors, it’s hard to do that with direct EB-5. If you’d like the EB-5 funds to eventually come into the business as a loan rather than equity, direct EB-5 doesn’t allow that either. All this lack of flexibility results from the fact that there can’t be more than one enterprise/layer involved, which in turn follows from the fact that the buck literally stops with the new commercial enterprise, thanks to the direct job limitation. The NCE is where the money has to be invested and spent and where the jobs have to be created; any associated job creation that’s not within that one new commercial enterprise is “indirect” by EB-5 definition and can’t be used to justify EB-5 investment.

　　传统的“直投型”EB-5计划只承认EB-5投资人所创造的“直接就业”，即接受EB-5投资人股权投资的新商业企业(NCE)所雇用的W-2类员工。这一规定限制了可被认可的就业数量(也由此限制了EB-5投资的最高额度)以及潜在的投资结构。直投型EB-5计划只为资金流向提供了一个去处，所有EB-5资金都只会流向这一个去处，且只有其中的W-2类全职就业岗位才能被视为投资者创造的就业。如果一个企业涉及多个实体(例如由经营地产的控股公司和负责运营的管理公司构成)，那么资金流向就有了两个去处，而直投型EB-5项目就无法适用了(除非作为管理公司的实体是控股公司全资拥有的子公司，即在实质上作为单一实体)。如果项目所创造的是非W-2类就业(如工地上的建筑工人)，那么直投型EB-5计划不会认可这些就业。如果你打算将某个独立实体中的EB-5投资人单独分离出来，而不是直接在企业中给予他们管理职权并与企业的其他非EB-5投资人混合，对于直投型EB-5计划而言这是极具操作难度的。如果你希望EB-5资金最终以贷款而非股权形式进入企业，这对于直投型EB-5计划而言同样也是行不通的。这一灵活性的欠缺是由于不允许牵涉一个以上的企业或层级的事实所造成的，而这一事实又是由于在直接就业的限制下资金实际只能停留在新商业企业所导致的。新商业企业是资金必须被投入和花费的对象，而所有就业也必须在其中进行创造。任何不在该新商业企业中创造的关联就业都将根据直投型EB-5计划规定被视为“间接”就业而无法用以支持EB-5投资。

　　The Regional Center program provides an attractive alternative to traditional direct EB-5 because Regional Center investors can be credited with “indirect” jobs, which EB-5 policy defines as “those that are held outside of the new commercial enterprise but are created as a result of the new commercial enterprise.” (Policy Memo p. 8) Indirect job creation opens up a new world of structure possibilities. Figure B shows a typical regional center investment with two pots: the new commercial enterprise (NCE) and the job-creating enterprise (JCE). The NCE is still subject to EB-5 requirements (must a single entity, must receive equity from the EB-5 investors, must give EB-5 investors a management role), but the business and job creation are separated in another pot that’s not so limited. The job-creating enterprise can encompass multiple entities, can receive investment from the NCE as debt or equity, can separate EB-5 and non-EB-5 investors, and can raise funds based on economic impact. If the Regional Center NCE has employees, it can verify them by submitting payroll records, just like a direct EB-5 NCE. However the typical Regional Center NCE has no business beyond investment and no employees. Instead, Regional Center investors in the NCE usually take credit for indirect jobs (i.e. the jobs created outside the NCE but resulting from the NCE’s investment – what’s in the green-shaded box in Figure B). These include impacts that an economic model would call direct (relating to the first round of inputs purchased by the subject industry) and indirect (relating to subsequent rounds of inputs purchased by supporting industries). If the job-creating enterprise funded by EB-5 investment is a hotel, the economic model would capture the employees required to build and operate the hotel and also some employment impacts of the hotel’s supply purchases. These new jobs could be on the payrolls of numerous third parties (the general contractor, the hotel manager, etc.), but it doesn’t matter because the NCE doesn’t have to control payroll records to verify job creation that happens outside it. EB-5 policy allows for using reasonable economic methodologies to calculate job creation outside the NCE. For an example, the economist could use RIMS II Type II multipliers developed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to calculate the employment impacts associated with the verified expenditures and revenues of a project funded by EB-5 investment.

　　区域中心计划相较传统的直投型EB-5计划显得更有吸引力，这是因为区域中心投资人可以创造“间接”就业，而美国投资移民EB-5政策将“间接”就业定义为“在新商业企业之外但由于新商业企业的投资而创造的就业”(《EB-5政策备忘录》第8页)。间接就业创造为各种潜在的投资结构打开了一扇门。图B显示了具有两个资金流向去处——新商业企业(NCE)和就业创造企业(JCE)的典型区域中心投资模式。新商业企业仍然受到EB-5规定的制约(即必须为单一实体、必须接受EB-5投资人的股权投资及必须给予EB-5投资人管理职权)，但在另一个限制相对较少的资金流向去处中，经营和就业创造是相互分离的。就业创造企业可以包含多个实体，可以通过借款或股权形式从新商业企业获得投资，可以分离EB-5和非EB-5投资人，还可以根据经济影响进行融资。如果区域中心的新商业企业拥有员工，则可以通过提供工资记录册来进行验证，就如同直投型EB-5计划中的新商业企业所做的那样。但是，一般的区域中心新商业企业除了投资以外没有业务，也没有员工。事实上，区域中心中的新商业企业投资人通常受益于间接就业(即在新商业企业之外但由于新商业企业的投资所创造的就业，如图B中绿色阴影框所示)。这其中包括了经济模型中所称的直接(主要行业购买的首轮投入)和间接(次要行业购买的非首轮投入)影响。假设就业创造企业是一家依靠EB-5投资建造的酒店，那么经济模型就会将那些建设和运营酒店的员工以及酒店供给品购置所带来的一些就业影响都统计在内。这些新的就业可能来自于大量第三方(总承包方、酒店管理公司等)所雇用的员工，但这并不要紧，因为新商业企业不需要通过控制工资记录册来验证在其之外所创造的就业。美国投资移民EB-5政策允许使用合理的经济方法论来计算在新商业企业之外创造的就业。例如，经济学家可以使用美国经济分析局开发的RIMS II乘数来计算EB-5项目支出和收入的就业影响。

　　Table A. Entity roles and relationships in a typical Regional Center investment (under current practice)

　　表A：一般区域中心投资中的实体角色和关系(依据现行惯例)

　　Why is all this important? When you’re judging whether a piece of Regional Center reauthorization legislation is worth supporting, keep my Figure B in mind. Make sure that the legislation retains the possibility of the NCE and JCE as distinct entities, crediting EB-5 investors with job creation that’s outside the NCE aka indirect. If that core defining feature is compromised, then whatever the legislation would authorize, it’s not the Regional Center program. The Leahy Grassley bill is currently not clear on indirect job creation or the distinction between NCE and the JCE. The bill proposes regulating Regional Centers as if and assuming that they control JCEs, which is often not the case in the Figure B model (and not necessarily desirable either, considering potential conflicts of interest). A number of provisions are just confusing given the NCE/JCE distinction (ie do the provisions about non-EB-5 investors on p. 6 apply to the NCE or JCE?). Most critically, the bill proposes limiting indirect job creation. Maybe the section on p. 4 only intended to require investors to count some jobs beyond those generated from supply purchases, which is fair, but the terms are not defined and can just as well mean that at least 10% of jobs need to be direct jobs within the NCE, which would destroy the Regional Center model.

　　为什么这会如此重要?当你评判某份区域中心再授权提案是否值得支持时，请记得参考前文的图B。尤其需要确认的是，提案是否将新商业企业和就业创造企业分为两个不同的实体，从而将EB-5投资人在新商业企业外创造的就业计算为间接就业。如果这一核心界定标准没有得到遵循，那么无论提案如何授权，区域中心项目都会变得名不副实。目前的Leahy Grassley提案并未就间接就业创造及新商业企业和就业创造企业两者的区别进行详细阐述。提案中建议对区域中心实施管控，就如同区域中心管控就业创造企业一样，而这通常不符合图B中所列出的模式(而且由于潜在利益冲突不一定可取)。还有一些规定混淆了新商业企业/就业创造企业的区别(例如，提案第6页针对非EB-5投资人的规定是否适用于新商业企业或就业创造企业?)。最为关键的是，该提案还建议对间接就业创造进行限制。可能的情况是，提案第4页的款项仅仅旨在要求投资人计算供应购买之外创造的部分就业，这是可以理解的，但是提案中并没有明确条款予以规定，因此也可能意味着至少有10%的就业必须为在新商业企业内创造的直接就业，而这将会破坏区域中心计划的模式。

　　To avoid confusion, anyone using the term “indirect job” must specify if he means the EB-5 policy definition (see p. 8 of the Policy Memo) or an economic model definition, and if so which model, since RIMS II and others slice up the impact pie slightly differently (for example see p. 33 and 50 of the RIMS II Handbook). And he should think about the definition. Regional Center program critics tend to talk about indirect jobs as if they were mere mathematical phantoms. That’s not the case. The carpenter who installs the floor at the EB-5-funded hotel and the housekeeper who will clean it both have heads that you can go touch if you like, although they both can be indirect jobs by the EB-5 policy definition. Their existence is usually inferred using financial data and economic models rather than verified by payroll records, since the Regional Center EB-5 investor is at a remove and probably lacks access to the payroll records, but that doesn’t make their employment a fiction. Heads get harder to locate and to touch when you get down to economist-definition indirect jobs, which look at ripple effects beyond the project site, but they’re not fictional either. (Or at any rate you have to go up against the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 1973 Nobel committee, and John Maynard Keynes himself to argue that multiplier effects are bogus. See the forthcoming July RCBJ for a good article on this topic.)

　　为了避免混淆，任何使用“间接就业”之处都必须说明其指的是EB-5政策定义(详见《EB-5政策备忘录》第8页)还是经济模式定义，且如果是经济模式定义的话具体是哪种模式，因为RIMS II模式和其它模式在经济影响的统计上会略有差异(详见RIMS II手册第33页和第50页)。另外，如何定义也值得考虑。区域中心计划的批评者常常将间接就业仅仅视为一种数学虚像，但这并非事实。在依靠EB-5资金建造的酒店安装地板的木匠和打扫卫生的酒店管理员都是活生生存在的个体，尽管他们根据EB-5政策定义都只能算作间接就业。在EB-5政策下，他们的存在通常是使用财务数据和经济模型而非工资单记录推定出来的，而区域中心的EB-5投资人往往不在工资单记录之列或者很可能根本无法看到工资单记录，但这些都不能使那些在间接就业岗位上工作的人成为虚构的个体。如果从经济学家定义的间接就业这一角度来看，这些从事间接就业的个体将会变得更加虚无缥缈，因为经济学家所考虑的是建设工地之外所产生的经济影响涟漪效应。(当然，你完全可以否定美国经济分析局、1973年诺贝尔奖委员会或者凯恩斯本人的观点，认为乘数效应就是伪造出来的结果。有关这一话题你可以参阅即将出版的《区域中心商业期刊》7月版中的相关文章。)

　　The benefits that come with indirect job creation are many. It’s possible to raise more EB-5 money when you can count more jobs – not only the W-2 jobs in a single entity but the wider economic impact of a given project. It’s possible to fund larger and more complex businesses when you’re not limited to all spending and employment occurring within a single entity. It’s possible to be a Regional Center and raise money for various independent projects in the community when you can set up NCEs separate from the JCEs and can verify job creation using economic methodologies. Architects of the Regional Center program intended it to facilitate the concentration of EB-5 immigrant investor capital into larger projects deemed more likely to have significant regional and national impact. Indirect job creation has made this vision possible. A typical direct EB-5 venture raises less than $2 million, as compared with raises in the tens of millions per project possible with indirect job creation and a Regional Center structure. We wouldn’t be talking about EB-5’s $3.58 billion contribution to GDP if we didn’t have the Regional Center program.

　　间接就业创造的利处还有许多。例如，项目方可以筹集到更多EB-5资金，而投资人也能获得更多可被承认的就业——不仅仅是某个单一实体中的W-2类就业，而是所属项目所带来的更为广泛的经济影响。在没有单一实体的开支和就业限制的前提下，为规模更大、结构更为复杂的企业提供融资将变为可能。在能够将新商业企业与就业创造企业相互分离，且能够使用经济方法论衡量就业创造的前提下，成立区域中心并为社区中各种独立项目提供融资也将变为可能。区域中心计划创立者们的本意旨在推进EB-5投资移民资本的集中化，以便将资金投入到那些更可能带来重大区域性和全国性影响的大项目中去。而间接就业创造的理念将这一设想变为可能。一个普通的直投型EB-5项目只能筹集到低于200万美元的融资，而相较之下，在间接就业创造模式和区域中心投资结构中每个项目可能筹集到的资金将高达数千万美元。如果没有区域中心计划，EB-5计划对美国国内生产总值35.8亿美元的贡献将成为泡影。

　　文章来源：

　　http://blog.lucidtext.com/2015/07/12/the-basics-regional-center-investment-structure-and-direct-and-indirect-job-creation/